

Version: August 29, 2023

POLI SCI 324: Chinese Politics

Fall 2023

Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Course information:

Lecture time: Monday/Wednesday 4:00–5:15 PM
Lecture location: VAN HISE 494
Instructional mode: In-Person
Number of credits: 4 credits
Prerequisite: Sophomore Status
Course designations: Intermediate Level
Breadth - Social Science
Counts as Liberal Arts and Science Credit in L&S
Graduate Attribute

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Office hours: Wed/Thu 1:45-3:45 PM and by appointment [here](#)

Teaching assistant: Junda Li
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Office hours: Tue 2:30–3:30 PM and Wed 10:00–11:00 AM

Course description: We will examine three questions about Chinese politics through a comparative perspective. First, what functions do formal institutions such as the political party, legislature, courts, and bureaucracy serve in China? Second, what are the political forces that lay a good foundation for China to successfully transition from a planning economy to a robust market economy and sustain high-speed growth for more than four decades? Finally, how does the Chinese government deal with various pressing social problems?

Learning objectives:

- Develop an understanding of major political institutions and governance challenges of China today.
- Evaluate evidence for China's economic reform and develop the ability to analyze other policy changes.
- Communicate effectively through written reports and discussion.
- (Graduate students only) Assess the state of a body of scholarly literature related to course themes, identify gaps in that literature, and formulate an original research

question in the context of those gaps.

How Credit Hours are Met by the Course: This is a four-credit course. This credit standard is met by an expectation of a total of 180 hours of student engagement with the course learning activities. These include regularly scheduled face-to-face course meetings (two 75-minute class periods per week, as well as one additional 50-minute discussion section every week, which will be led by your teaching assistant). It also presumes reading, writing, study and review, and other responsibilities as described in this document.

Access to the North Hall: The Political Science department is located in North Hall, the oldest building on campus. Due to its age, this building is not accessible to individuals with mobility disabilities and does not have an elevator or accessible restroom. The department is committed to equal opportunity for all students to attend office hours, advising, and other department-related events. Please contact me if North Hall presents a disability-related barrier to you, and the department will gladly work to ensure access. If you require a disability-related accommodation for the academic requirements of this course unrelated to North Hall, please review the “Accommodations for Students with Disabilities information.”

Regular and Substantive Interaction: Several learning activities ensure that students have regular and substantive interactions with the instructor.

- Students participate in regularly scheduled learning sessions twice a week (where there is an opportunity for direct interaction between the student and the instructor) and can come to office hours held by the instructor.
- The instructor will provide written and/or oral comments for an individual student’s exam and term paper.
- Instructor posts announcements and email check-ins about academic aspects of the class.
- Identify students struggling to reach mastery through observation of discussion activity and assessment completion and offer additional opportunities for interaction.

Course Requirements

Undergraduate students: Undergraduate students are expected to regularly show up in lectures and discussion sections, take two open-book exams, and write a term paper.

- Midterm Exam (40%). This is an **open-book, one-hour** exam. This midterm exam covers all the materials covered in the first half semester. The exam will take place in class on **October 30, 2023**.
- Participation (20%). The student must show up in all lectures and TA-led discussion sections (10 points). For each missing lecture or TA section (including leaving the class earlier), the student loses one point until all ten points are used up. Absences

for religious or university-sponsored activity will be accommodated but must be cleared with the instructor or the TA in advance. The student is also encouraged to participate in the course actively through in-class discussions and after-class office hours (10 points).

- There are two options for the final project (40%). The “research track” requires a term paper, and the “learning track” requires an open-book final exam. Students can complete both tracks, and their grades will be based on whichever track gives the higher score.
 - Research Track: Term Paper (40%). A student choosing the “research track” is required to produce a term paper that analyzes the politics behind the success or failure of a major policy change or reform. Students are encouraged to investigate a reform in China, though the geographical focus on China is not strictly required. However, students CANNOT write about a reform already covered in this course. A high-quality term paper should (1) provide necessary background information for readers to understand the key issues at stake for the reform, (2) pinpoint the major obstacles to the reform, (3) summarize the existing explanations for why the reform succeeded (or failed) and (4) offer your analysis with proper evidence. The term paper cannot exceed **20 double-spaced pages**, including tables, figures, and references.¹ The appendix to this syllabus contains detailed instructions for this assignment. Students who intend to write a term paper must discuss their research plan with the instructor before writing. The term paper is due on **December 20, 2023** at 6:05 P.M. (CST).
 - Learning Track: Final Exam (40%). The final exam will also be **open-book** and will last **one hour**. Everything covered in the course, with an emphasis on the second half semester, may be tested. The final exam will take place on **December 20, 2023** from 5:05 to 6:05 P.M. (CST).

Graduate students: Graduate students who take this class will propose a research project, implement it, and complete another referee report for an optional article.

- Research Proposal (30%). The proposal discusses the question that you’d like to answer in your term paper. It should summarize the literature related to this question, how your analysis will make a contribution to the literature, and your research design. The proposal should not exceed 20 double-spaced pages (**everything** included). The proposal is due on **October 30, 2023**.
- Term Paper (50%). Your term paper should analyze a question related to the theme of this class. It should clearly identify a question, motivate why the question is important, summarize how this analysis contributes to a deeper understanding of this question, utilize appropriate data and methods, and interpret the results. The term paper is due on **December 20, 2023** at 6:05 P.M. (CST).
- Referee Report (20%). The graduate student will produce a referee report on an optional reading in this class (indicated by a [-] symbol). Please inform the instructor

¹Students must seek the instructor’s permission if the paper’s length must exceed 20 pages.

of your choice of paper before you start writing. The report should not exceed 5 double-spaced pages. The referee report is also due on **December 20, 2023** at 6:05 P.M. (CST).

The grading scale is as follows, including the overall points as well as the University of Wisconsin's range for letter grades:

Point Range	Letter Grade	GPA
90–100 points	A (Excellent)	4.0
85–89.99 points	AB (Intermediate grade)	3.5
80–84.99 points	B (Good)	3.0
75–79.99 points	BC (Intermediate grade)	2.5
70–74.99 points	C (Fair)	2.0
60–69.99 points	D (Poor)	1.0
59.99–0 points	F (Failure)	0.0

Disputes. I occasionally make mistakes or otherwise misinterpret answers. If you believe that your grade is incorrect as a result of an error, please submit a request for a grade change *in writing* to me within 48 hours of receiving the grade. This document should be a stand-alone document such as a .pdf (i.e. not an email). In the appeal, please clearly and concisely explain why the grade is incorrect, based on the merit of the work rather than comparisons to other students or various adverse consequences (i.e. I need a better grade to get into law school). Please note that re-grading may result in an increase *or* a decrease in the initial grade.

Make-up Exam. Attendance at exams is a special category. I take missed exams very seriously, as they provide you an unfair advantage over your colleagues in the form of additional time to study. This is why, *if you miss an exam, you must provide within one week a written, valid excuse, such as a doctor's note.* Unexcused exam absences will result in a 10-point reduction off the top of your make-up exam grade. For example, if you miss an exam without an excuse and then score perfectly on the make-up exam (40/40), your actual grade on the exam will be 30/40. If you have not communicated with me within one week from the date of the exam, a make-up exam is no longer an option.

Classroom Policies

Plagiarism and Academic Honesty. By virtue of enrollment, each student agrees to uphold the high academic standards of the University of Wisconsin-Madison; academic misconduct is behavior that negatively impacts the integrity of the institution. Cheating, fabrication, plagiarism, unauthorized collaboration, and helping others commit these previously listed acts are examples of misconduct which may result in disciplinary action. Examples of disciplinary action include, but is not limited to, failure on the assignment/course, written reprimand, disciplinary probation, suspension, or expulsion. To understand more about plagiarism and proper attribution of sources, please consult the [Writing Center](#).

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities. The University of Wisconsin-Madison supports the right of all enrolled students to a full and equal educational opportunity. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Wisconsin State Statute (36.12), and UW-Madison policy (Faculty Document 1071) require that students with disabilities be reasonably accommodated in instruction and campus life. Reasonable accommodations for students with disabilities is a shared faculty and student responsibility. Students are expected to inform [McBurney Disability Resource Center](#) and faculty [me] of their need for instructional accommodations by the end of the third week of the semester, or as soon as possible after a disability has been incurred or recognized. Faculty [I], will work either directly with the student [you] or in coordination with the McBurney Center to identify and provide reasonable instructional accommodations. I am more than happy to accommodate needs, but it is your responsibility to complete this process officially and in a timely manner, within three weeks of course inception (or upon the recognition of a disability).

Diversity and Inclusion. Diversity is a source of strength, creativity, and innovation for UW-Madison. We value the contributions of each person and respect the profound ways their identity, culture, background, experience, status, abilities, and opinion enrich the university community. We commit ourselves to the pursuit of excellence in teaching, research, outreach, and diversity as inextricably linked goals. The University of Wisconsin-Madison fulfills its public mission by creating a welcoming and inclusive community for people from every background – people who as students, faculty, and staff serve Wisconsin and the world. For more information, please visit: <https://diversity.wisc.edu/>.

Academic Calendar & Religious Observances. Please find the relevant information [here](#).

COVID-19. Please refer to <https://covidresponse.wisc.edu>.

Course Schedule

Instructions:

- There is no textbook for this course. All reading materials can be accessed through the library or will be provided by the instructor.
- Required readings for undergraduate students are indicated with a [●] symbol. Optional readings, which are not required in any way, are marked with a [-] symbol.
- Graduate students, however, should aim to read all materials. They should pay close attention to those readings indicated by [●] symbols and skim through the papers marked by a [-] symbol.
- I draw on the reading materials from the most cutting-edge research in political science and economics. As a result, many articles may seem “too technical” for an undergraduate student. The goal of reading, at least for the purpose of this course,

is not to fully appreciate or critique the technical part of the paper or book chapter. Instead, students should aim to understand the article's internal logic and theoretical arguments. The instructor will further elaborate on the article's analytical part in the class. Hence, an undergraduate student should read at least the Abstract, Introduction, Institutional Background, and Conclusion of a paper.

- When reading a paper, find the answer to the following questions:
 - What is the question that this study answers?
 - Why is this question important?
 - What is the answer offered by the author(s)?
 - What is the theoretical logic of this answer?
 - Is there any evidence provided by the author(s) to support this answer?
 - Graduate students only: Can you find any internal inconsistency in the author's theoretical arguments? Are there any critical assumptions in the theory that the author did not examine or may not be true in the real world? Methodologically, are there any major problems that may overturn the results? Would the results be different if we performed the same analysis in other countries? Is there anything that the author(s) did not examine in the paper? Can you create a research design to investigate such questions further?

PART I. INTRODUCTION

September 6: **Getting China Right**

Required readings:

- Course syllabus
- Opening remarks of the “2+2” U.S.-China Summit in Alaska on March 18, 2021 [[video](#), [transcript](#)]

Optional readings:

- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and Samuel P. Huntington. 1965. *Political Power: USA/USSR*. New York: The Viking Press. (Read the Introduction Chapter)
- Sullivan, Jake. 2023. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution.” [[transcript](#)]
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. W. W. Norton & Company. (Read Chapter 10 “Great Power Politics in the Twenty-First Century”)

PART II. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

September 11 and 13: **Overview of the Chinese Political System**

September 18: **One-Party State I: Division of Labor**

Required readings:

- Lei, Zhenhuan. 2023. "Making Decentralization Work: The Party-State System as the Fundamental Institution of China's Economic Reforms and Development." Working Paper.

Optional readings:

- Zhou, Xueguang. 2022. *The Logic of Governance in China An Organizational Approach*. Cambridge University Press.

September 20 and 25: **One-Party State II: Top-Down Inspections and Corruption**

Required readings:

- Chen, Ting, and James Kai-Sing Kung. 2019. "Busting the 'Princelings': The Campaign Against Corruption in China's Primary Land Market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(1): 185–226.
- Wang, Erik. 2020. "Frightened Mandarins: The Adverse Effects of Fighting Corruption on Local Bureaucracy." *Comparative Political Studies*, 55(11): 1807-1843.

Optional readings:

- Liao, Xingmiu, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. 2020. "Strengthening China's Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level." *The China Journal*, 84(1): 29-50.
- Chen, Zhiyuan, Xin Jin, and Xu Xu. 2021. "Is a Corruption Crackdown Really Good for the Economy? Firm-Level Evidence from China." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 37(2): 314-357.
- Kong, Dongmin, and Ni Qin. 2021. "China's Anticorruption Campaign and Entrepreneurship." *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 64(1): 153-180.
- Wang, Peng, and Xia Yan. 2020. "Bureaucratic Slack in China: The Anti-corruption Campaign and the Decline of Patronage Networks in Developing Local Economies." *The China Quarterly*, 243: 611-634.
- Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2020. *China's Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jiang, Junyan, Zijie Shao, and Zhiyuan Zhang. 2022. "The Price of Probity: Anticorruption and Adverse Selection in the Chinese Bureaucracy." *British Journal of Political Science*, 52(1): 41-64.
- Yang, Wenhui. 2021. "Corruption Monitoring and the Supply of Politicians in China." *Governance*, 34(1): 229-249.
- Zhu, Boliang. 2017. "MNCs, Rents, and Corruption: Evidence from China." *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(1): 84-99.
- Manion, Melanie. 2004. *Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland*

China and Hong Kong. Harvard University Press.

- Fisman, Raymond, and Yongxiang Wang. 2015. “[The Mortality Cost of Political Connections](#).” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 82: 1346-1382.
- Jia, Ruixue, and Huihua Nie. 2017. “[Decentralization, Collusion, and Coal Mine Deaths](#).” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 99(1): 105-118.

September 27: Political Selection I: Competence-Loyalty Tradeoff

Required readings:

- Fisman, Raymond, Jing Shi, Yongxiang Wang, and Weixing Wu. 2020. “[Social Ties and the Selection of China’s Political Elite](#).” *American Economic Review*, 110(6): 1752-1781.

Optional readings:

- Landry, Pierre F., Xiaobo Lü, and Haiyan Duan. 2018. “[Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder](#).” *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(8): 1074–1105.
- Gueorguiev, Dimitar D., and Paul J. Schuler. 2016. “[Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy](#).” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 16(1): 87 - 116.
- Lu, Fengming, and Xiao Ma. 2019. “[Is Any Publicity Good Publicity? Media Coverage, Party Institutions, and Authoritarian Power-Sharing](#).” *Political Communication*, 36(1): 64-82.
- Kou, Chien-wen, and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. 2014. “[“Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System](#).” *The China Journal*, 71: 153-171.
- Lee, Don S., and Paul Schuler. 2020. “[Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?](#)” *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(3-4): 531-566.
- Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim. 2015. “[Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance](#).” *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13(4): 631-668.
- Jiang, Junyan, and Zhaotian Luo. 2021. “[Leadership Styles and Political Survival of Chinese Communist Party Elites](#).” *The Journal of Politics*, 83(2): 777-782.
- Manion, Melanie. 1993. *Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests*. Princeton University Press.
- Recommended Documentary: [The Chinese Mayor](#) (BBC)

October 2: Political Selection II: Publicity

Required readings:

- Lu, Fengming, and Xiao Ma. 2019. “Is Any Publicity Good Publicity? Media Coverage, Party Institutions, and Authoritarian Power-Sharing.” *Political Communication*, 36(1): 64-82.

Optional readings:

- Gueorguiev, Dimitar D., and Paul J. Schuler. 2016. “Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy.” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 16(1): 87 - 116.

October 4: **Bureaucracy I: Grassroots Bureaucrats**

Required readings:

- Mattingly, Daniel C. 2020. “Responsive or Repressive? How Frontline Bureaucrats Enforce the One Child Policy in China.” *Comparative Politics*, 52(2): 269-288.

Optional readings:

- He, Guojun, and Shaoda Wang. 2017. “Do College Graduates Serving as Village Officials Help Rural China?” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(4): 186-215.
- Recommended TV drama: [Minning Town \(山海情\)](#). YouTube provides English subtitles. This TV drama depicts the Chinese anti-poverty campaign and the efforts of rural bureaucrats in this campaign.
- Recommended documentary: Farewell to Poverty (摆脱贫困) [EP1, EP2, EP3, EP4, EP5, EP6, EP7, and EP8] (China Central Television) This government-produced documentary gives the most detailed description of Xi Jinping’s anti-poverty campaign. Although the documentary contains lengthy praises of the Party and Xi Jinping, I hope you can pay attention to the crucial role played by grassroots officials in making the anti-poverty campaign possible. Unfortunately, the documentary does not offer English subtitles.

October 9: **Bureaucracy II: Personal Connections in Politics**

Required readings:

- Jiang, Junyan. 2018. “Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4): 982-999.

Optional readings:

- Pan, Jennifer, and Kaiping Chen. 2018. “Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances.” *American Political Science Review*, 112(3): 602-620.
- Li, Yishuang, and Zhenhuan Lei. 2021. “The Limits of a Centralized Bureaucracy: Evidence from the Stock Market in China.” Working Paper.
- Recommended TV drama: [In the Name of People \(人民的名义\)](#). YouTube offers

English subtitles.

October 11: **Bureaucracy III: Bureaucratic Responsiveness**

Required readings:

- Distelhorst, Greg, and Yue Hou. 2017. "[Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule: Evidence from China.](#)" *Journal of Politics*, 79(3): 1024-1040.

Optional readings:

- Köhler, Ekkehard, John G. Matsusaka, and Yanhui Wu. 2023. "[Street-Level Responsiveness of City Governments in China, Germany, and the United States.](#)" *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 51(2): 640-652.
- Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. 2016. "[Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(2): 383-400.
- Jiang, Junyan, Tianguang Meng, and Qing Zhang. 2019. "[From Internet to Social Safety Net: The Policy Consequences of Online Participation in China.](#)" *Governance*, 32(3): 531-546.
- Ding, Iza. 2020. "[Performative Governance.](#)" *World Politics*, 72(4): 525-556.

October 16: **Legislature I: Another Rubber-Stamp Parliament?**

Required readings:

- Truex, Rory. 2020. "[Authoritarian Gridlock? Understanding Delay in the Chinese Legislative System.](#)" *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(9): 1455-1492.

Optional readings:

- Tanner, Murray Scot. 1999. *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes and Democratic Prospects*. Oxford University Press.
- O'Brien, Kevin J. 1994. "[Chinese People's Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early Organizational Development.](#)" *Comparative Political Studies*, 27(1): 80-107.
- Yang, Wenhui. 2023. "[Power Concentration and Bottom-up Information Flow: Evidence from Chinese Municipal Congresses.](#)" Forthcoming in *Governance*.
- Lü, Xiaobo, Mingxing Liu, and Feiyue Li. 2018. "[Policy Coalition Building in an Authoritarian Legislature: Evidence From China's National Assemblies \(1983-2007\).](#)" *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(9): 1380-1416.

October 18: **Legislature II: Informational Problem**

Required readings:

- Truex, Rory. 2016. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Mod-*

ern China. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (Read Chapters 1 and 2; all other chapters are recommended)

Optional readings:

- Manion, Melanie. 2014. “[Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China](#).” *The China Quarterly*, 218: 311–338.
- Manion, Melanie. 2017. “[‘Good Types’ in Authoritarian Elections: The Selectoral Connection in Chinese Local Congresses](#).” *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(3): 362–394.
- Hou, Yue. 2019. *The Private Sector in Public Office: Selective Property Rights in China*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Liu, Dongshu. 2023. “[Policy Influence of Delegates in Authoritarian Legislatures: Evidence from China](#).” *Political Research Quarterly*, 76(2): 481-495.
- Zuo, Cai. 2022. “[Legislator Attributes and Advocacy Focus: Non-electoral Sources of Parochialism in an Indirectly-Elected Legislature](#).” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 57(4): 433-474.
- Feng, Xinrui, Yue Hou, and Mingxin Liu. 2021. “[Underrepresented Outperformers: Female Legislators in the Chinese Congress](#).” Forthcoming in *The China Quarterly*.
- Optional: Manion, Melanie. 2015. *Information for Autocrats: Representation in Chinese Local Congresses*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

October 23: **Judiciary I: The Authoritarian Rule of Law?**

Required readings:

- Wang, Yuhua. 2015. *Tying the Autocrat’s Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China* . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (Read Chapters 1 and 2)

Optional readings:

- Li, Bo, and Jacopo Ponticelli. 2022. “[Going Bankrupt in China](#).” *Review of Finance*, 26(3): 449-486.
- Zhang, Taisu, and Tom Ginsburg. 2019. “[China’s Turn toward Law](#).” *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 59(2): 306-389.

October 25: **Judiciary II: Sources of Judiciary Biases (and Solutions)**

Required readings:

- Lei, Zhenhuan, and Yishuang Li. 2023. “[Making Local Courts Work: The Judicial Recentralization Reform and Local Protectionism in China](#)” Forthcoming in *the Journal of Politics*.

Optional readings:

- Cao, Guangyu, Chenran Liu, and Li-An Zhou. 2023. “[Suing the Government under Weak Rule of Law: Evidence from Administrative Litigation reform in China](#).” *Journal of Public Economics*, 222: 104895.

- Zhang, Peng. 2023. “Anti-corruption Campaign, Political Connections, and Court Bias: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits.” *Journal of Public Economics*, 222: 104861.
- Ding, Iza, and Jeffrey Javed. 2021. “The Autocrat’s Moral-Legal Dilemma: Popular Morality and Legal Institutions in China.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(6): 989-1022.
- Hou, Yue, and Rory Truex. 2022. “Ethnic Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing in China.” *The Journal of Politics*, 84(4): 2294-2299.
- Wang, Yuedan. 2021. “‘Detaching’ Courts from Local Politics? Assessing the Judicial Centralization Reforms in China.” *The China Quarterly*, 246: 545-564.
- Xu, Jian. 2020. “The Role of Corporate Political Connections in Commercial Lawsuits: Evidence From Chinese Courts.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(14): 2321-2358.
- Lu, Haitian, Hongbo Pan, and Chenying Zhang. 2015. “Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits.” *Journal of Law and Economics*, 58(4): 829-861.
- Wang, Yuhua. 2018. “Relative Capture: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From the Chinese Judiciary.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(8): 1021-1041.
- Ang, Yuen Yuen, and Nan Jia. 2014. “Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and the Use of Courts Among Private Firms in China.” *The Journal of Politics*, 76(2): 318-332.
- Recommended movie: Dying to Survive (我不是药神). This movie is based on the Lu Yong case discussed in Ding and Javed (2020).

October 30: **In-Class Midterm Exam (60 minutes)**

Part III. Lessons from China’s Economic Reform

November 1: **The Economic Failures (and Preparation) under Mao’s China**

Required readings:

- Lin, Justin Yifu. 1990. “Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 98(6): 1228-1252.

Optional readings:

- Chen, Yi, Ziyang Fan, Xiaomin Gu, and Li-An Zhou. 2020. “Arrival of Young Talent: The Send-Down Movement and Rural Education in China.” *American Economic Review*, 110 (11): 3393-3430.
- Fan, Jingting, and Ben Zou. 2021. “Industrialization from Scratch: The “Construction of Third Front” and Local Economic Development in China’s Hinterland.” *Journal of Development Economics*, 152: 102698.

- Zhang, Qi, Dong Zhang, Mingxing Liu, and Victor Shih. 2021. “Elite Cleavage and the Rise of Capitalism under Authoritarianism: A Tale of Two Provinces in China.” *The Journal of Politics*, 83(3): 1010-1023.
- Kasahara, Hiroyuki, and Bingjing Li. 2020. “Grain Exports and the Causes of China’s Great Famine, 1959–1961: County-Level Evidence.” Forthcoming at *Journal of Development Economics*.
- Chen, Shuo, and Xiaohuan Lan. 2017. “There Will Be Killing: Collectivization and Death of Draft Animals.” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(4): 58–77.
- Meng, Xin, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared. 2015. “The Institutional Causes of Famine in China, 1959-61.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 82(4): 1568-1611.

November 6: Deng’s Rural Reform

Required readings:

- Lin, Justin Yifu. 1992. “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China.” *American Economic Review*, 82(1): 34-51.

Optional readings:

- Chari, Amalavoyal, Elaine M Liu, Shing-Yi Wang, and Yongxiang Wang. 2021. “Property Rights, Land Misallocation, and Agricultural Efficiency in China.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 88 (4): 1831–1862.
- Almond, Douglas, Hongbin Li, and Shuang Zhang. 2019. “Land Reform and Sex Selection in China.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(2): 560-585.

November 8: Gradualism

Required readings:

- Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2016. *How China Escaped the Poverty Trap*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Read Chapters 1 and 2)

Optional readings:

- Lau, Lawrence J., Yingyi Qian, and Gerard Roland. 2000. “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 108(1): 120-143.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2006. “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform.” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 44(4): 973-987.
- Che, Jiahua, and Yingyi Qian. 1998. “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113(2): 467–496.

November 13: Decentralization

Required readings:

- Xu, Chenggang. 2011. [“The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development.”](#) *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(4): 1076-1151. (Read Sections 1-3; other sections are recommended.)

Optional readings:

- Treisman, Daniel. 2007. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge University Press. (Read Chapters 1 and 2)
- Maskin, Eric, Yingyi Qian, and Chenggang Xu. 2000. [“Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form.”](#) *The Review of Economic Studies*, 67: 359-378.
- Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast. 1995. [“Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China.”](#) *World Politics*, 48(1): 50-81.
- Cai, Hongbin and Daniel Treisman. 2006 [“Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?”](#) *World Politics*, 58: 505-535.
- Recommended TV drama: [Like a Flowing River \(大江大河\)](#). YouTube offers English subtitles.

Part IV. (Some) Governance Challenges

November 15: Rural Governance

Required readings:

- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró I Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. 2022. [“The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China.”](#) *American Economic Review*, 112(9): 2921-2958

Optional readings:

- O’Brien, Kevin J., and Lianjiang Li. 2000. [“Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State: Introducing Village Elections in China.”](#) *The China Quarterly*, 162: 465-489. (Background and history of introducing village elections in China)
- Mattingly, Daniel C. 2016. [“Elite Capture: How Decentralization and Informal Institutions Weaken Property Rights in Rural China.”](#) *World Politics*, 68(3): 383-412.
- Mattingly, Daniel C. 2019. *The Art of Political Control in China*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsai, Lily. 2007. [“Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China.”](#) *American Political Science Review*, 101(2): 355-372.
- Xu, Yiqng, and Yang Yao. 2015. [“Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Goods Expenditure in Rural China.”](#) *American Political Science Review*, 109(2): 371-391.
- Looney, Kristen E. 2021. [“Mobilization Campaigns and Rural Development: The East Asian Model Reconsidered.”](#) *World Politics*, 73(2): 205-242.

November 20: Public Investment

Required readings:

- Lei, Zhenhuan, and Junlong Aaron Zhou. 2022. “Private Returns to Public Investment: Political Career Incentives and Infrastructure Investment in China.” *The Journal of Politics*, 84(1): 455-469.

Optional readings:

- Lei, Zhenhuan. 2023. “The Political Resource Blessing or Curse? Patronage Networks, Infrastructure Investment, and Economic Development in China.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 56(8): 1156–1188.
- Ma, Xiao. 2022. *Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China’s High-Speed Railway Program*. Oxford University Press.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, and Nancy Qian. 2020. “On the Road: Access to Transportation Infrastructure and Economic Growth in China.” *Journal of Development Economics*, 145: 102442.
- Baum-Snow, Nathaniel, J. Vernon Henderson, Matthew A. Turner, Qinghua Zhang, and Loren Brandt. 2020. “Does Investment in National Highways Help or Hurt Hinterland City Growth?” *Journal of Urban Economics*, 115: 103124.
- Kuang, Chun, Zijie Liu, and Wenyu Zhu. 2021. “Need for Speed: High-Speed Rail and Firm Performance.” *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 66: 101830.
- Dong, Xiaofang, Siqi Zheng, and Matthew E. Kahn. 2020. “The Role of Transportation Speed in Facilitating High Skilled Teamwork across Cities.” *Journal of Urban Economics*, 115: 103212.
- Baum-Snow, Nathaniel, Loren Brandt, J. Vernon Henderson, Matthew A. Turner, and Qinghua Zhang. 2017. “Roads, Railroads, and Decentralization of Chinese Cities.” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 99(3): 435-448.

November 22: Environment

Required readings:

- He, Guojun, Yang Xie, and Bing Zhang. 2020. “Expressways, GDP, and the Environment: The case of China.” *Journal of Development Economics*, 145: 102485.

Optional readings:

- Alkon, Meir, and Erik H. Wang. 2017. “Pollution Lowers Support for China’s Regime: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Beijing.” *The Journal of Politics*, 80(1): 327-331.
- Chen, Yvonne Jie, Pei Li, and Yi Lu. 2018. “Career Concerns and Multitasking Local Bureaucrats: Evidence of a Target-Based Performance Evaluation System in China.” *Journal of Development Economics*, 133: 84-101.
- Sun, Jingran, Linfeng Yue, Xiangyu (Dale) Li, and Min Dai. 2023. “Environmen-

- tal Governance in China: The Effects of Policy Clarity, Career Concerns, and New Appointed Officials on Pollution Control." *Policy Studies Journal*, 51(2): 397-417.
- Zheng, Siqi, Matthew E. Kahn, Weizeng Sun, and Danglun Luo. 2014. "Incentives for China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism." *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 47: 61-71.
 - Liu, Mengdi, Ruipeng Tan, and Bing Zhang. 2021. "The Costs of "Blue Sky": Environmental Regulation, Technology Upgrading, and Labor Demand in China." *Journal of Development Economics*, 150: 102610.
 - Karplus, Valerie J., and Mengying Wu. 2023. "Dynamic Responses of SO2 Pollution to China's Environmental Inspections." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 120(17): e2214262120.
 - Van der Kamp, Denise S. 2021. "Blunt Force Regulation and Bureaucratic Control: Understanding China's War on Pollution." *Governance*, 34(1): 191-209.
 - Li, Jun, and Jing Vivian Zhan. 2023. "Environmental clientelism: how Chinese private enterprises lobby under environmental crackdowns." Forthcoming in *The China Quarterly*.
 - Eaton, Sarah, and Genia Kostka. 2014. "Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined? Local Leaders' Time Horizons and Environmental Policy Implementation in China." *The China Quarterly*, 218: 359-380.
 - Eaton, Sarah, and Genia Kostka. 2017. "Central Protectionism in China: The "Central SOE Problem" in Environmental Governance." *The China Quarterly*, 231: 685-704.
 - Greenstone, Michael, Guojun He, Ruixue Jia, and Tong Liu. 2022. "Can Technology Solve the Principal-Agent Problem? Evidence from China's War on Air Pollution." *American Economic Review: Insights*, 4 (1): 54-70.
 - Zhang, Bing, Xiaolan Chen, Huanxiu Guo. 2018. "Does Central Supervision Enhance Local Environmental Enforcement? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from China." *Journal of Public Economics*, 164: 70-90.
 - He, Guojun, Shaoda Wang, and Bing Zhang. 2020. "Watering down Environmental Regulation in China." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(4): 2135-2185.
 - Kahn, Matthew E., Pei Li, and Daxuan Zhao. 2015. "Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 7 (4): 223-42.
 - Li, Pei, Yi Lu, and Jin Wang. 2020. "The Effects of Fuel Standards on Air Pollution: Evidence from China." *Journal of Development Economics*, 146: 102488.
 - Zhan, Xueyong, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, and Shui-Yan Tang. 2014. "Contextual Changes and Environmental Policy Implementation: A Longitudinal Study of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Guangzhou, China." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 24(4): 1005-1035.

November 27: **Public Opinion**

Required readings:

- Nicholson, Stephen P., and Haifeng Huang. 2023. “[Making the List: Reevaluating Political Trust and Social Desirability in China.](#)” *American Political Science Review*, 117(3): 1158–1165.

Optional readings:

- Lorentzen, Peter L. 2013. “[Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime.](#)” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8(2): 127-158.
- Wang, Yuhua, and Bruce J. Dickson. 2022. “[How Corruption Investigations Undermine Regime Support.](#)” *Political Science Research and Methods*, 10(1): 33-48.
- Tsai, Lily L., Minh Trinh, and Shiyao Liu. 2022. “[What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-Level Evidence from China.](#)” *The Journal of Politics*, 84(1): 602-606.
- Truex, Rory. 2022. “[Political Discontent in China Is Associated with Isolating Personality Traits.](#)” *The Journal of Politics*, 84(4): 2172-2187.

November 29 and December 4: **Censorship**

Required readings:

- Chen, Yuyu, and David Y. Yang. 2019. “[The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?](#)” *American Economic Review*, 109(6): 2294-2332.
- Huang, Haifeng. 2015. “[International Knowledge and Domestic Evaluations in a Changing Society: The Case of China.](#)” *American Political Science Review*, 109(3): 613-634.

Optional readings:

- Huang, Haifeng, and Yao-Yuan Yeh. 2019. “[Information from Abroad: Foreign Media, Selective Exposure and Political Support in China.](#)” *British Journal of Political Science*, 49(2): 611-636.
- King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margarete E. Roberts. 2013. “[How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expressions.](#)” *American Political Science Review*, 107(2): 326-343.
- Gueorguiev, Dimitar D., and Edmund J. Malesky. 2019. “[Consultation and Selective Censorship in China.](#)” *The Journal of Politics*, 81(4): 1539-1545.
- Qin, Bei, David Strömberg, and Yanhui Wu. 2017. “[Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests versus Surveillance and Propaganda.](#)” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31(1): 117-140.

Part V. China’s Global Economic Influence

December 6: Foreign Aid

- Blair, Robert A., and Philip Roessler. 2021. "Foreign Aid and State Legitimacy: Evidence on Chinese and US Aid to Africa from Surveys, Survey Experiments, and Behavioral Games." *World Politics*, 73 (2): 315 - 357.
- Optional: Nugent Jeffrey B., and Jiaxuan Lu. 2021. [China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment in the Belt and Road Initiative: What are the Motives for Chinese Firms to Invest?](#) Forthcoming in *China Economic Review*.
- Optional: Eichenauer, Vera Z., Andreas Fuchs, Lutz Brückner. 2021. "The Effects of Trade, Aid, and Investment on China's Image in Latin America." *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 49(2): 483-498.
- Optional: Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2021. "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 13 (2): 135-74.
- Optional: Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Brad Parks, Austin M Strange, and Michael J Tierney. 2017. "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa." *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1): 182-194.
- Optional: Broz, J. Lawrence, Zhiwen Zhang and Gaoyang Wang. 2020. "Explaining Foreign Support for China's Global Economic Leadership." *International Organization*, 74 (3): 417 - 452.

December 11: US-China Trade Disputes

- Kim, Sung Eun, and Yotam Margalit. 2021. "Tariffs As Electoral Weapons: The Political Geography of the US-China Trade War." *International Organization*, 75(1): 1-38.
- Optional: Chyzh, Olga V., and Robert Urbatsch. 2021. "Bean Counters: The Effect of Soy Tariffs on Change in Republican Vote Share between the 2016 and 2018 Elections." *The Journal of Politics*, 83(1): 415-419.
- Optional: Fetzer, Thiemo, and Carlo Schwarz. 2021. "Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars." *The Economic Journal*, 131(636): 1717-1741.
- Optional: Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, Gary Pisano, and Pian Shu. 2020. "Foreign Competition and Domestic Innovation: Evidence from US Patents." *American Economic Review: Insights*, 2(3): 357-374.
- Optional: Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2020. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure." *American Economic Review*, 110 (10): 3139-83.
- Optional documentary: Faces of Huawei [EP1, EP2, EP3] The US government put several sanctions over Huawei due to allegations ranging from espionage based on its 5G technology, violating the US sanctions against Iran, and intellectual prop-

erty theft among others. This documentary provides a unique insight into how this Chinese enterprise deals with the US sanctions. The documentary (episodes 1 and 3 particularly) also answers why, quite counter-intuitively, Huawei's CEO (see his Chinese interviews [here](#) and [here](#), both of which are also highly recommended, or (less in-depth) English interviews at [BBC](#) and [Bloomberg](#)) and employees feel that the US sanctions are a good thing for the company in the longer term.

December 13: **Rethinking the "China Model"**

December 20: **Final Exam** (5:05–6:05 P.M.) and **TERM PAPER DUE**

Appendix: Term Paper Preparation Guide (Undergraduate)

Your term paper is worth 40 points if you choose to complete a research track as your final project. You will analyze a political reform (preferably, for the sake of this course, in China) that takes place in any part of the world and at any time. You should only focus on one specific reform in your paper. I will grade the term paper based on the extent to which you have successfully achieved the following goals:

- **Provide enough background information** (10 points). Please provide the background information relevant to your case. You should assume that the reader knows nothing about the specific setting that you are analyzing. You will lose points if your paper does not provide enough background information for the reader to understand what is going on. You do not have to write anything irrelevant to your specific research question. For instance, when you analyze a specific foreign policy reform in the United States, there is no need to write a section on American history. But you do want to provide background information about this specific foreign policy problem.
- **Pinpoint the major problem** (5 points). In this part, you should answer the following questions – What was the purpose of the reform? What kind of challenges did the leader face to implement the reform? What made it so difficult? For instance, if you are analyzing Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform in the 1980s, you should tell us what difficulty Deng faced in the wake of the reform. The difficulty for him to reform China’s centrally planned economy (among many other things) is that he will need to persuade the ruling elites to support his reform agenda while transforming the planned economy that many “old guards” in the Party were eager to defend.
- **Existing explanations** (10 points). Summarize the existing explanations for why this reform has failed (or succeeded). This requires you to do some research on the existing literature. Please properly cite others’ work. The style of citation does not matter. What matters is that you cite accurately, and people can use your citations to find the paper.
- **Analysis** (15 points). What is your explanation for the failure or success of this reform? Provide theoretical reasoning to support your and use empirical evidence to support your argument. This part will be graded based on how persuasive your argument is and how convincing your evidence is. Your empirical analysis of evidence can be either quantitative (e.g., regression analysis) or qualitative (e.g., case studies). Among the 15 points in total, 5 points will be based on the merit of your argument, 5 points will go to the quality of your evidence, and the remaining 5 points will be based on your analysis of evidence.

Other Requirements:

- Your paper cannot exceed 20 pages in total (everything included – bibliography, tables, appendix, etc.) unless you obtain an exception from the instructor. For each additional page beyond the 20th page, you lose 1 point until all 40 points are lost.

- Please use double space and 12 points. Your margins should be 1 inch (which is, in most cases, the standard setting in Microsoft Word or Latex).
- Please write down your name on the first page; otherwise, you will lose 2 points (a cost you pay for our time to search for your name through other methods).
- Late submission: This assignment is due at the final class. For every minute late, you lose 0.5 points until it uses up all 40 points.